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Power-Trading in Wireless Communications:
A Cooperative Networking Business Model
Sithamparanathan Kandeepan Senior Member, IEEE, Sudharman K.
Jayaweera Senior Member, IEEE and Riccardo Fedrizzi
Abstract
Managing the power resource in battery operated wireless devices is very crucial for extending the
lifetime, here we propose the concept of power trading in wireless communications. We present a business
model using sealed bid procurement auction based game theory for power-trading in cooperative wireless
communication with quality of service (QoS) constraints. We formulate the problem as an auction in
a buyer’s market sequentially/repeatedly played with a single source and a multiple relay network. The
source, in-need of cooperation of a relay due to lack of battery power to communicate with the destination,
broadcasts a cooperation-request specifying its QoS requirements. The QoS that we consider here are the
bit error rate and the total delay associated with relaying the source data. The relays respond with their
bids in terms of Euros/bit, and the source selects the best relay based on the bids. The relays compete
with each other to win the game and profit from power trading. Each relay updates its pricing index via
reinforcement learning to win the game during successive bidding intervals of the repeated game. Based
on this model our results show that the relay node with the best features such as a better wireless channel
and a better geographical position with respect to the source and destination nodes has a better chance
of winning the game, and hence giving rise to a dominant strategy. More importantly, we show that the
gains from the wireless channels can be converted into economic profits which is an attractive feature of
the proposed business model for power trading.
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Power trading, auction game, power efficiency, economic cost, price power profile.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current 3G systems have a tendency to rapidly dissipate power in the mobile devices due to
the power hungry applications. This has brought up concerns in the industrial sector considering
such devices depend on batteries for their power. The future 4G devices on the other hand are
expected to be always connected supporting higher data rates with multiple radios that require more
and more power as well. In order to improve the power efficiency of wireless communications
cooperative wireless networks [1] have been proposed in the literature at the expense of additional
complexity and overheads. Here we consider such a cooperative communication network as a
means to trade power in wireless and mobile communications for local power efficiency.
We present a business model to trade power between a single source node and several relay
nodes considering procurement auction based game theoretic model using a first price auction [2].
The source node which is in need of help of a relay node to communicate with its destination due
to insufficient power broadcasts a cooperation request to its neighbors. The neighboring nodes
then respond with a sealed-bid (price offer) for the cooperation based on a price-power profile
as explained in the paper that is deemed to be locally power efficient to the source node. Since
we only consider a single source node the auction becomes a buyer’s market. The relay nodes
compete with each other to win the cooperation for the source node to profit from it hence forming
a procurement auction game. The relay nodes also perform reinforcement learning (RL) in order
maximize their profits during the successive bidding processes for a discrete sequential/repeated
game. In our business model, we also consider the quality of service requested by the source node
to the relay nodes in terms of the maximum bit error probability and the maximum acceptable
delay in relaying the data. We show that the gains from the wireless channels which are obtained
at no additional cost1 can be directly converted into economic profits which is a highly desirable
feature of the proposed business model for power trading.
While the authors in [3] have presented a relay selection scheme for multiple buyer/multiple
1Wireless channel gains can be treated as natural gains coming from the natural/man-made environments of the wireless channels
perceived with no additional cost in the proposed power trading business model. Thus, making economic profit out of such natural
gains is a very attractive feature of this proposed power trading business model
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seller scenario to maximize the information rate for the source nodes, this work does not consider
RL nor the QoS constraints and more importantly does not deal with power efficiency. By means
of RL a relay node could learn the pricing offers from the other relays in the past and bid its
future values subsequently to maximize the economic profit, which is one of the key contributions
presented in this paper. The authors in [4] study when and how to opt for cooperation for power
efficiency considering network fairness and efficiency; again no RL nor the concept of power
trading were proposed here.
Moreover, the authors in [5] consider a game theoretic approach to present a pricing function
for noncooperative power control game in CDMA networks, where the proposed pricing function
is proportional to the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SNR). In [6], the authors consider
pricing for transmit power levels in order to achieve Pareto improvement in the noncooperative
power control game. They consider a pricing function proportional to the transmit power. The
authors in [7] on the other hand present a spectrum trading framework that considers pricing for
multiple-buyer multiple-seller based dynamic spectrum access networks, which can possibly be
adopted for power trading. Again, none of the above work consider reinforcement learning and
the QoS constraints such as the delay.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the considered wireless
communications problem with the proposed cooperative and business models. The network model
is presented in Section III followed by the power trading game formulation in Section IV con-
sidering the BER constraint. In Section V the RL model is presented followed by the inclusion
of the delay constraint into the power trading game in Section VI. In Section VII we present the
convergence of the game followed by the analysis of the overhead cost in Section VIII. Simulation
results are presented in Section IX with some final concluding remarks in Section X.
II. THE COOPERATION AND BUSINESS MODELS
The reference scenario considered here for power trading is motivated by the ICT-EU-FP7
funded ’C2POWER’ project [12]. In this project multi-radio terminals are considered in cooper-
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ative networks for power efficient communications. The source node in order to save power to
transmit to the access point (AP), especially when the battery level is low, tries to cooperate with
the neighboring node(s) as shown in Figure-1, thus increasing its life time. Such a scenario forms
a strong power trading application in wireless and mobile communications attracting the cellular
network operators and other stakeholders.
Based on the above scenario we consider a two-hop cooperative system with N relay nodes
Ri; i = 1; 2::N and a single source(S)-destination(D) pair, as described in Figure 2. For such
a network model one could adopt various cooperation and business models. In our cooperation
model S broadcasts a cooperation-request with the destination details and the required QoS in
terms of the maximum (acceptable) bit error probability  and the maximum allowable delay d
for data relaying. The relay nodes then privately respond to the request with the price quotations
in terms of i Euros/bit with the offered QoS. The determination/computation of the price i
by the respective relay nodes is described later in this section and in detail in Section IV. The
source node then selects the best option (relay selection) to minimize its transmit power P tS and
the economic cost based on its own policies and affordability. After selecting the best relay S
cooperates with it to communicate with the destination as shown in Figure 2. The selected Ri
receives the information from S, decodes, and relays to the destination node using the decode-
and-forward cooperative protocol [1]. Note that the proposed framework can easily be adapted to
any other cooperative communications protocol, such as amplify-and-forward.
We next describe the business model adopted for the power trading in the network. We first
present the power trading model based on the minimum required bit error rate  and then extend
the game model considering the delay constraint d. Based on the required bit error probability
, Ri calculates its own cost in terms of the required power P tRi to relay to the destination node.
The transmit power from the relay to destination P tRi would depend on the transmit power from
the S to relay P tS to meet the the bit error rate (BER)  as well as various other parameters such
as locations of S;Ri; D nodes, and the quality of the wireless channels etc. The transmit power
requirement at Ri is then converted to an equivalent economic cost, priced as i (Euros/bit).
SUBMITTED ON 18 JULY 2011, RESUBMITTED ON 23 DEC 2011 AND 07 FEB 2012. 5
In our model, we assume that for all Ri’s and S, there exists a fixed common base-cost of 
(Euros/bit/Watt) known to all the nodes in the network. This assumption can be waived considering
different base-costs i for each Ri and s for S. However, for the sake of simplicity, in our model
we consider the fixed common base-cost in analyzing the proposed business model (i.e. the game).
Thus, the price i quoted to S by Ri is given by
i(P
t
S) = iP
t
Ri
(P tS) (1)
where i and P tRi are functions of P
t
S , i is a real number always greater than one known as the
pricing index which is decided by Ri and is only known to Ri. When i = 1, the ith relay node
gains no profit by helping S but simply covers the cost incurred due to the committed power for
the cooperation. When i > 1 an economic profit of (i   1)P tRi (Euros/bit) is made by the
respective relay node. In our model, every Ri will have a minimum value for i denoted as mini
only known to Ri such that 1 < mini  i which gains a minimum profit of (mini   1)P tRi for
the cooperation (if it wins). The determination of mini is modeled as a function of the residual
battery charge amount qresi of Ri, and is given by,
mini = 1 + a exp( bqresi ) (2)
where a; b 2 R+. Note that since P tRi is a function of P tS (i.e. in order to meet the minimum BER
requirement), the price quotation i is also a function of P tS which we denote as the price-power
profile. The price-power profile (i vs P tS) is then used to calculate the bid to be sent to S by
the respective Ri given by the pair fP^ tS; ^ig where P^ tS and ^i are some points in the domains of
P tS and i respectively. The determination of the bid values fP^ tS; ^ig to maximize the profit for
Ri and minimize the cost for S is discussed in Section IV. Figure 3 depicts an example of the
price-power profile corresponding to a particular Ri with guaranteed QoS.
Based on our business model it is possible that one node (or a few nodes) can be advantaged
by its (their) geographical location(s) with respect to S and destination nodes, especially when
the environmental parameters are unchanged. In this case the advantaged Ri, by means of RL
(as discussed later), can unfairly increase the price for the cooperation bringing out dominance
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in the game. The competition from the other players however would avoid such an unfair act
from the dominant Ri and in case of no competition from the other relays it will be controlled
by the buyer (the source node) which would simply decline such offers. This is an example of
a Nash equilibrium for the considered game. Furthermore, if the maximum power that could be
committed by S is insufficient to guarantee the QoS even with cooperation then we have a no-play
situation in the game.
It is important to note here that our objective is not to achieve power efficiency at the network
level but only at the nodal level at S. In other words, even though when the cooperation proves to
be power efficient to S, the total power spent for the cooperative communication considering P tRi
and P tS may be more than the power required for the non-cooperative case where S communicates
with D directly. We also restate that the motivation of our work is to support the source node in
need of help due to low battery power level as described in Section II.
A. Business Plans for Power Trading
The business providers (such as the Portuguese Telecom (PTI) involved in the C2POWER
project [12]) can make use of the power trading application presented in this paper and derive
their own business plans to trade power between two nodes. The business plans can vary depending
on whether the nodes belong to the same network or different nodes, in the latter case economic
incentives transacted between the nodes become complicated. An interesting feature that could
be adopted in the business plan could be the ’friendly-mode’ and ’business-mode’ features. In
the friendly-mode feature the cooperating Ri can choose to help a friendly node without being
motivated by any economic gains, and in the business-mode feature the cooperative node will
have a motivation to make economic profit as discussed in this paper. The user therefore could
choose between the two options for power trading.
III. THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK MODEL
In this section we present the network model adopted here, we also note that the proposed
power trading business model and the concept of pricing for cooperation is not restricted to
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the adopted network model here (with specific modulation-channels etc.) but could be extended
to any network in general. The network model also assumes context awareness meaning that
many parameters of its own are known to the nodes by means of cognitive learning processes as
mentioned in Section II, hence giving us a cognitive-cooperative network model. We only present
the cooperative network model here and assume that cognition exists in the network and provides
the necessary information. For the cooperative network in Figure 2 the received signals for the
communications from S ! D, S ! Ri, and Ri ! D can be expressed in the form of,
r(t) =
1
L(d)
h(t)s(t) + (t) (3)
where, ignoring the subscripts, s is the transmitted signal, h is the small scale fading channel
given by a complex Gaussian process or equivalently the envelope of the channel jhj is given by a
Rayleigh process with a slowly varying mean square average of E[h2] = h2,  is the additive noise
at the receiver with a double-sided power spectral density of N0=2, and L(d) is the mean pathloss
due to a given transmitter-receiver (T-R) separation of d in meters. The pathloss component L(d)
for all the links are given by the pathloss exponent  as [9],
L(d) = L(d0)(d=d0)
 (4)
where, L(d0) is the pathloss at a reference distance d0 which is given by the free-space pathloss [9]
L(d0) = (4fd0=c)
2, where f is the carrier frequency and c = 3 108 is the speed of light. With
the assumption of context awareness, the above mentioned parameters such as the T-R separations
d, the channel power levels h2, the pathloss exponents  are all known to the respective nodes
(but not to the other nodes).
We consider BPSK communication system as an example for all the links considered in equation
(3) in order to illustrate the power trading business model with a guaranteed BER. The bit error
probability under Rayleigh fading with AWGN thus for all the links is given by [9],
 = 0:5

1 
p
 =(1 +  )

(5)
where   = Ebh2=N0 is the average SNR, Eb is the bit energy given by Eb = P t=(L(d)), and
(bits/s) is the data rate of the respective links. Note that in the above equations we ignore the
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subscripts of S;Ri or D because they are true for all the links considered here. Furthermore, if 
is the overall BER of the concatenated communication from S ! Ri ! D and S and R are the
BER of S ! Ri and Ri ! D links respectively then  is given by  = R(1 S)+S(1 R).
By recognizing that 2RS is much less than S and R, the overall BER  reduces to
  S +R (6)
IV. THE POWER TRADING GAME
First we present the power trading game considering the bit error rate constraint  and then
we extend the game model for the delay constraint later in Section VI. We consider the strategic
form of the game considering the procurement auction model defined by G = hI; A;
i, where
I = f1; 2    ; N+1g is the set of players in the game (i.e. all Ri and S), A = A1A2   ANAS
is the cartesian product of the sets of actions available to each player with Ai being the action set
of player i, and 
 = f
1;
2;    ;
N ;
Sg is the set of reward functions. We also note that in our
notations we refer to i for all the parameters related to Ri and refer to i  for all the parameters
related to the relay nodes other than Ri.
Repeated Game: Since we assume multiple cooperation requests (sufficiently large number of
times) from S, the game is thus played every time S requests for the cooperation. Hence giving us
a repeated discrete game, in which the bidders can learn from the previously deployed strategies
	i corresponding to the action ai 2 Ai and revise their bids successively with a revised strategy
if improvement in the bids are foreseen, as discussed in the next section.
First Price Auction: The first price auction is considered here, in which the relay node with
the bid corresponding to the minimum cost for S wins the game and cooperates with S with the
quoted minimum bid.
The Rewards: The payoff or the reward 
i 2 
 for Ri for the cooperation (power sale) can be
directly related to the economic profit described subsequently to (1). The reward 
i is only known
to Ri and not known to the other relays Ri  or the source node S. If Ri wins the cooperation for
S then the reward is 
i = (i   1)P tRi , and if Ri does not win the cooperation then the reward
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is 
i = 0, as depicted in Figure 4. In order to maximize the reward Ri needs to maximize i or
in other words needs to increase i as described below.
^i = argmax
i
fji   P tRijg = argmaxi fP
t
Ri
(i   1)g (7)
The above maximization is performed by Ri by simply increasing i by means of RL as described
in the next section. The reward for S on the other hand is given by 
S = P0   Ci, where P0
is the required transmit power for the S ! D direct transmission link and P0 is the economic
cost associated with it with Ci being the cost for cooperating with Ri as described subsequently.
Relay Selection: The economical cost (price to pay) for S to cooperate with Ri is given by
Ci = P
t
S + i (8)
where, P tS is the required transmit power for the relay communication link S ! Ri. Based on the
source node’s local policy it can choose Ri which minimizes power or price (at the expense of
each other), here we consider minimizing the price. That is, S selects the relay Ri and chooses
the corresponding P tS by maximizing the economical gain (the reward) 
S , given by,
P^ tS = max
i;P tS
fP0   Ci;Ci  P0; P tS  P0g (9)
Alternatively, we could say that S minimizes Ci with the conditions Ci  P0 and P tS  P0. It
should be noted that S chooses P^ tS based on (9) only when the conditions Ci  P0 and P tS  P0
are satisfied, if not the cooperation is deemed to be more expensive or infeasible, respectively,
and therefore S rejects the offers from Ri.
Bid Calculations: We now describe how Ri calculates the price-power profile i = iP tRi .
Considering the BER requirement of  at S, using (6) and the BER expression in (5), node Ri
calculates the relationship between P tRi (required transmit power at Ri) and P
t
S (the corresponding
required transmit power at node S), given by,
P tRi =
2
h22(1  2)
L(d2)N0R (10)
where h22 is the channel power, d2 is the T-R separation, R is the data rate for the transmission
from Ri ! D, and
 = 1  2
 
   0:5
 
1 
r
 1
1 +  1
!!
(11)
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where  1 =
h21P
t
S
L(d1)N0S
is the average SNR, h21 is the channel power, S is the data rate, and L(d1)
is the T-R separation associated with the link S ! Ri. The relay node Ri then uses (10) and (11)
together with (1) to generate the price-power profile i vs P tS . It is important to note here that Ri
(most of the battery powered wireless devices in general) would have a maximum transmit power
limit (typically around 15dBm to 20dBm for commercial products), which in turn determines the
start points of the price-power profiles i described in Figure 3. If S accepts the deal with Ri
then the relay node could either keep the same price for the successive times or increase the price
by increasing i. On the other hand, if S does not accept the offer initially, or successively, then
Ri may choose to decrease the price by decreasing i. Note that, Ri cannot decrease i below
mini , and in such situations Ri has to simply wait until the environmental conditions change (e.g.
improvement in the channel gain etc.) to provide a better offer to S.
Considering the strategy adopted by S as in (9), which is assumed to be known to Ri, the relay
would then also adopt the same strategy to choose fP^ tS; ^ig given by (9) for its bids from the
computed price-power profile and chooses ^i = iP tRi(P^
t
S) correspondingly. The value of i for
the initial bid may be chosen to be a random value between mini and 
min
i + 1 to maximize its
reward, and by means of RL, as discussed in the next section, i would be changed subsequently
based on the relative values of Ci and Ci  considering the decisions made by S. Once the bid
values are computed relays will place their bids to S by means of a response message to the
cooperation request from S, and S will collect all the bids and initiate the cooperation with the
relay corresponding to the minimum Ci.
The Rules of the game: The game is governed by a set of rules followed by all the players
and in a real scenario can be imposed by means of policies and protocols. (1) S cannot negotiate
the price but can only decide on accepting or declining the offer given by Ri. (2) Any relay
Ri can re-quote their prices to S after RL by changing their pricing index i in the successive
cooperation requests until Ri cannot afford to provide a better price unless the environmental
conditions improve. 3) If two or more Ri offer the same bid with the lowest price then S will
select one of them randomly.
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V. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Since the power trading game is played sequentially, depending on whether the bid from Ri
was accepted or not by S, the relay Ri can learn the relative values of Ci  with respect to its
own Ci (i.e. whether Ci ? Ci ) by means of RL. Note that Ci  are not known to Ri and hence
this game resembles a classical closed-bid auction model. Based on RL during the subsequent
bids, if Ri wins the cooperation, it knows that Ci < Ci  and hence i is subsequently updated to
increase the reward as
i(t+ 1) = i(t) + !
+
i ; !
+
i 2 R+ (12)
The value of i is increased as in (12) in a greedy manner until the cooperation is lost (at a point
where Ci > Ci ) at which point Ri will reduce i as described below. The corresponding i value
(when Ri loses the cooperation) is recorded as maxi and Ri does not exceed this value in the
future unless the environmental conditions are changed. Note that maxi needs to be updated when
the environmental conditions change. If Ri does not win the cooperation for S, or if it loses the
cooperation after winning, then it knows that Ci > Ci  and hence i is subsequently updated as,
i(t+ 1) = i(t)  ! i ; ! i 2 R+ (13)
whilst meeting the condition i  mini . In general, the updates of the pricing index i is given
by i(t + 1) = i(t) + !i for Ri, where !i 2 f+!+i ; ! i g. Note that i is lower bounded by
i  mini  1 and the updating process for i is stopped when it reduces to i = mini . Likewise,
when i increases continuously (when Ri keeps on winning), i will be upper bounded by maxi .
Note that a strict upper bound for i corresponds to the condition where Ci < P0.
VI. DELAY-CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS WITH GUARANTEED BER
In the previous sections we formalized the sequentially played auction game for power trading
considering the BER constraint. Here, we also include the delay constraint into the power trading
business model for S with delay sensitive traffic. The delay that we consider here is the delay
in relaying the entire data from S by Ri to the destination node. The delay here is therefore
characterized by the traffic that Ri is handling and whether the relay node agrees to provide
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primary access or secondary access (opportunistic access) to its channel resources for S. In the
case of Ri providing primary access to S the delay could be well quantified and it would be rather
a straight forward process to say if the delay constraints can be met or not, that is a guaranteed
service could be provided to meet the delay constraint. On the other hand if Ri provides secondary
access to S, where S can only access Ri opportunistically, then Ri needs to notify S with a
parameter quantifying the delay associated with data relaying.
In the work that we present here we consider the secondary access mechanism for S to access
the relay (i.e. opportunistic relay access [10]) and quantify the delay QoS by the probability of
meeting the delay-threshold d based on the relay node’s traffic. Based on the characteristics of
its own traffic at Ri it can come up with a value for the success probability in meeting the delay
threshold d for a given data length say Dp bits at a data rate of  bps. As an example by assuming
a simplistic Poisson-exponential traffic model at Ri with a Poisson arrival rate of  (s 1) and a
mean exponential hold time of ^ , the probability of meeting the delay threshold i at the relay
node i can be computed as [10],
i =  (K0; (d))   

K0; d

1  1
K0

K0
K0   1
K0
exp

  d
K0

(14)
where, K0 = b Dp=1=  TH c,  is the transmission switching delay, TH is the packet overhead delay,
and  (a; b) = 1
 (a)
R b
0
ta 1 exp( t)dt is the normalized lower incomplete Gamma function with
 (a) being the standard Gamma function. Therefore, by knowing its own traffic characteristics
the relay nodes can quantify the delay QoS similar to the example shown above to S during
the bidding process. Even though the example provided above considers the Poisson-exponential
traffic model it can be used to get an average estimate for the probability of success in meeting
the delay constraint in general. A point to note here is that Ri supporting higher data rates can
benefit more from this model since K0 would reduce for higher data rates giving a better i value
for the same traffic rate . The bid to S containing the delay metric then would be a triple given
by fP^ tS; ^i;ig.
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The strategy adopted by Ri for making the bid fP^ tS; ^i;ig will also be changed when the delay
constraint is considered. The delay metric i does not affect the selection of the parameters from
the power delay profile such as the values of P^ tS and ^i, however it would impact the minimum
pricing index mini that relates to the rewards 
i. In Section II we defined the pricing index i
to be a function of the residual battery charge of Ri, now by considering the delay constraints
for the relay transmissions as described in this section i could be modified by incorporating the
delay metric i. The new pricing index therefore is defined letting a = i in (2), given by,
mini = 1 + i exp( bqresi ) (15)
In the above expression mini reduces when the traffic load is higher at Ri (i.e. when i reduces),
at the same time and when there is no traffic load at Ri(i.e. when i = 1) then mini only depends
on the residual battery charge of Ri. The relay node Ri will then use (7) to maximize its reward
as discussed previously.
The strategy adopted by S will also change considering the delay constraint. Below we provide
two strategies that S can adopt to choose the winner considering the BER as well as the delay
constraints. The first strategy is to simply check if the delay metric from the bids i meet a
predefined value 0 set by S and then choose Ri in a similar manner considering (9), given by,
P^ tS = max
i;P tS
fP0   Ci;Ci  P0; P tS  P0;i  0g (16)
Using the above strategy it is possible that S will not choose any of the relays for cooperation if
the delay constraint is not met even though the BER constraint is satisfied. The second strategy
that could be adopted by S is to include the delay constraint metric i directly in the cost function
Ci. Considering the delay constraint we can redefine the cost function for S as,
Ci =
1
(i   )(P
t
S + i) (17)
where  > 0 is a small real number to avoid very large values for Ci to perform the optimization
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process, moreover the bid from Ri is rejected if i   (i.e. if Ci becomes negative). This way S
could also maintain the delay constraint by setting  = 0 and at the same time opt for Ri with
a smaller delay. Then by using the optimization strategy in (9) S will choose the corresponding
relay for the cooperation by using (17).
VII. THE CONVERGENCE, NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY
To prove the convergence of the proposed power trading game, though one could provide a
rigorous mathematical proof, we argue that the cost function Ci has a global minimum that assures
an equilibrium point. For a wireless channel that does not vary over the duration of our interest
let us first consider the cost function in (16) first. The cost function Ci = P tS + iP
t
Ri
can
be represented as a sum of two functions given by f = P tS and g = iP
t
Ri
, in the domain
P tS . The function f is convex for finite and positive values of  because it is linear with P
t
S .
Next we consider the function g. For non-zero, positive and finite values of the environmental
parameters the BER in (5) for the link S ! Ri, denoted by S , is a convex function2 in P tS .
Therefore, the BER for the R ! D link, denoted by R given by R =    S (Appendix-
1, for finite and positive ) is a concave function in P tS . From (5), the relay transmit power
P tRi = (1   2R)2=[1   (1   2R)2] is a decreasing convex function in R, and hence we can
show that [11] P tRi(R(P
t
S)) is a convex function in P
t
S . Therefore, g is convex in P
t
S for finite
positive values of i. The cost function Ci = f + g is therefore a summation of two convex
functions and hence Ci itself is convex in P tS , which gives rise to a unique (global) minimum for
a given range of P tS . Since Ci is continuous and convex, and the action sets are compact there
exists a Nash equilibrium. It is important to note here that the proposed cost functions in (16)
and (17) are constrained by the conditions Ci  P0 andP tS  P0 as indicated in the expressions.
Therefore, the values of i are bounded by such constraints forcing towards an equilibrium point.
For the cost function in (17), a similar argument as above can also be presented since (i  )
does not depend on P tS and hence could be treated as a constant giving us Ci =
1
i (f + g).
2BER curves that are functions of transmit power are convex in general.
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Since f + g is convex and i is a constant in the domain P tS the cost function Ci (as in (17)) is
also convex, and hence Nash equilibrium exists as per our previous argument.
The Nash equilibrium can be proved for a general model with an arbitrary modulation technique
as long as the relay transmit power P tRi is a convex function in P
t
S for a BER constraint of
 = R +S , which proves that the cost function Ci is convex. It can be easily argued that P tRi
in general is convex in P tS since one needs to be traded off with the other (similar to the curves
shown in figure-3) to satisfy  = R +S for most of the modulation schemes.
A. Sequential Games in Rapidly Varying Channels with Reinforcement Learning
As in any general learning techniques, the proposed reinforcement learning technique would
only become useful for sufficient number of games played sequentially when the channel environ-
ment is stable. Therefore, for the channels with smaller coherent times the reinforcement learning
feature would not be of much benefit depending on the values of !i, the frequency of cooperation
requests and the coherence time. Nevertheless, for rapidly changing channels, the stability of the
system is still maintained based on the arguments presented in Section VII (Nash equilibrium),
and hence the power trading game could be still played. In other words the Nash equilibrium
exists for every single cooperation request, the equilibrium point however changes when i is
changed by Ri when RL is used, or the equilibrium point changes when the channel environment
changes. This is further understood in the numerical results section later.
VIII. OVERHEAD-COST FOR POWER TRADING
The proposed business model for power trading requires a bidding process for every cooperation
request for the repeated games. A properly defined protocol suite is therefore required in order
to have power-trading game as an application with the appropriate management and billing
functionalities. The design of such a protocol suite is an ongoing work and is beyond the scope of
this paper/topic. However, in this paper, we consider the associated costs related to the overheads.
During the bidding process S broadcasts a cooperation request message, sends a cooperation
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agreement message once a relay node is selected and finally sends a cooperation termination
message once the relaying is completed. These messages will also include the necessary man-
agement and billing information for the cooperation. Note that we consider the control messages
are received without errors such that retransmissions of the same are not required. The overall
overhead is minimized and the cooperation is made as simple as possible in order to gain maximum
from the power trading application. Therefore an energy efficient protocol suite is much needed
to have successful power trading.
Suppose the total number of overhead bits for the overhead messages is QOH (bits) and the total
information/data bits to be relayed is Qdata (bits) then it is reasonable to assume that QOH <<
Qdata. Correspondingly, if COH is the total economic cost associated with the overhead messages
then the cost functions given in (8) and (17) can be modified to include COH . Note that the
overhead cost COH is a fixed cost and is common for every single cooperation for all the relays.
COH can be well quantified in practice since all the parameters associated with the overhead
transmissions such as transmit power level, packet length, data rate etc. are known to S once the
protocol suite is designed. Therefore, considering the overhead costs COH , equations (8) and (17)
can be respectively redefined as,
Ci = P
t
SQdata + iQdata + COH (18)
Ci =
1
(i   )(P
t
SQdata + iQdata + COH) (19)
Note that the above given cost functions consider the total cost for sending an entire message
of length Qdata as oppose to the previous cost functions in (8) and (17) which consider only
the cost associated with sending a single bit. The redefined reward for S in this case, given by

S = P0Qdata Ci, depends on COH and thus it turns out that a minimum number of data bits
needs to be relayed in order for S to get a profit. Let us consider the cost function Ci in (18), to
profit from the cooperation (i.e. for 
S > 0), S needs to relay at least Qmindata bits given by,
Qmindata = COH=[P0   (P tS + i)] (20)
SUBMITTED ON 18 JULY 2011, RESUBMITTED ON 23 DEC 2011 AND 07 FEB 2012. 17
From the above equation we observe that Qmindata reduces with reducing overhead cost (numerator
of (20)) and increasing economic profit when considering no overhead cost (denominator of (20)).
In reality, with high bandwidth applications in the current era, S generally should have sufficient
amount of data Qdata compared to Qmindata in order to have positive rewards. Quantifying Q
min
data
requires COH to be quantified which in turn needs the protocol suite to be defined for the power
trading application. Therefore, we omit any further analysis with overheads and assume that
sufficiently large information data is available to be relayed.
The relay nodes on the other hand will incorporate the overhead costs associated with the
bidding and relaying process within the price index i. If OH corresponds to the price index
value associated with the overheads on the relay node’s side then the minimum price index could
be modified to include the overhead costs given by.
mini = 1 + i exp( bqresi ) + OH (21)
Moreover, the Nash equilibrium and the convergence of the power trading game does not change
since COH is independent of P tS and i, in other words COH is treated as a constant parameter
within Ci as given in equations (18) and (19). Therefore the Nash equilibrium, as proven before,
holds true for the business models with cooperation overheads.
IX. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Numerical and simulation results are provided to explain the power trading game and its
convergence under stable channel conditions. We consider sufficiently large information data to be
sent from S and hence eliminate the requirement to consider overheads in our numerical examples,
in other words we do not consider the cost/reward functions presented in Section VIII in our numer-
ical/simulation analysis since it requires the quantification of COH . We select the following simu-
lation parameters considering that i > 0; 8i for the strategy given in (16):  = 1; N = 3;  =
1e   3;S = 400kbps; h2 for all the channels are 1; fS = 1800MHz;Ri = 1000kbps; fR =
1800MHz; N0 =  163dBw/Hz; dSRi = [
p
5;
p
80;
p
45]; dRiD = [
p
113;
p
26;
p
45] and dSD =
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p
162. Figures 5 and 6 show the cost function (equation (8)) and the price-power profiles (equation
(1)) associated with the three relays considering various environmental conditions. In both the
figures R2 dominates the strategy set due to its relative position and the channel gains, and
therefore having a lower cost respect to the other two relays. The figures also depict the power
requirement P0 for the link S ! D and the corresponding economic cost P0 for the source
for a minimum BER of . Therefore, based on these results S selects R2 for the cooperation
which provides better power efficiency with a lower economic cost. This clearly proves that S
and R2 benefit from the trade due to the cooperation using the natural gains in the communication
channels.
The steady state of the repeated power trading game for an unchanged radio environment
(channel) with RL is analyzed next. Figure 7 shows the results of the repeated game played
for power trading between the relays. The figure shows the dynamic adaptation of the pricing
index i by the relays and the corresponding rewards 
i (scaled by 1000
i + 3 to display in the
same figure) during the successive games. As observed, the dominant relay R2 wins the game
initially and then tries to maximize its profit by increasing 2, and at one point (during the 11th
sequence) the cost associated with R2 exceeds the cost of R3 (i.e. C2 > C3) and thus R3 wins the
game. At this point R2 updates its max2 and starts to reduce 2 and wins the game successively.
The outcomes of the game thereafter remain the same until the environmental conditions change.
Once the environmental conditions change the game goes through another transient stage and
converges again. Figure 8 shows the convergence of the game by observing the reward vs price-
index trajectories. As we observe; R1 does not win at any time due to its weak strategy; R3 wins
the game once (due to the greediness of R2); R2 wins the game initially due to its dominant
strategy, increases its profit subsequently, loses once to R3, and then after reducing its pricing
index it keeps winning successively until the environmental conditions change.
From the results we see that the RL process leads to the second price auction model result by
rewarding the winner with the second best bidder’s reward (in this case with a small difference
due to the finite values of !). Therefore, one could argue that the second price auction model
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could be adopted here directly without RL which would maximize the reward for the winner.
However, in this case it would not provide the chance for the losers of the game to win during
the subsequent cooperations without RL. Therefore RL plays an important role to adapt the bids
and maximize the rewards.
Finally, we present the simulation results for a time varying channel with varying channel gains.
Figure 9 presents the simulation results for the rewards 
i for the case of time varying channels. In
the figure we observe two time durations where the channel is almost static and the corresponding
advantaged Ri uses RL technique to maximize the reward. At the same time the figure also shows
a time duration where the channel changes rapidly and hence the relays are unable to learn about
the other relays’ bids due to insufficient training duration in the learning process, however the
advantaged node at every instance during this time wins the game. A point to note here is that, as
mentioned in Section VII, we observe from the figure that the game converges to an equilibrium
point (i.e. not more than one advantaged player wins the game) at any instance of the time, the
equilibrium point changes for different cooperation requests when i or the channels are varied,
and the equilibrium point is unchanged for a static (slowly varying) channel when i is unchanged.
X. CONCLUSIONS
A power trading business model with QoS constraints for wireless communications was pre-
sented using cooperative communications and game theory with the first price auction model. The
business model considers the bit error rate and the total delay as QoS constraints, and an example
was provided for BPSK communication in Rayleigh fading channel and for a Poisson-exponential
traffic model at the relays. The same business model however could be easily adopted for a generic
communication model and a traffic model. Reinforcement learning was used by the competing
relay nodes in order to maximize the reward for the repeated games. Our results showed that the
relay node with a better wireless channel and a geographic position (hence having a dominant
strategy) wins the game, and is able to maximize its reward using reinforcement learning for
successive cooperations with sufficient learning time. The Nash equilibrium was also proved for
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the proposed game model even when reinforcement learning is considered at the relay nodes. We
also showed that the natural gains from the wireless communication channels can be converted
into economic profits based on the proposed business model which we consider is a very attractive
feature. The overhead cost related to the bidding process was also considered and it turns out the
the source node requires to send a minimum data length through the selected relay in order to
gain from power trading. The design of the protocol suite for this application is an ongoing task
which would then allow us to quantify the true overhead cost. Future research directions in this
topic are to consider multihop scenarios with multiple source terminals where the relay nodes
would then have the choice to choose the source node that would maximize its reward, giving us
a multiple-buyer multiple-seller auction model.
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Fig. 1. Cooperative scenario for power trading
Fig. 2. Power trading game with a set of relays Ri
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Fig. 3. The price-power profiles obtained by the relays for guaranteed QoS
Fig. 4. Expected payoffs/rewards for the relay nodes from power trading
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Fig. 5. The cost function Ci and the price-power profiles i for the network with i = 1; SR = 1:8; RD = 2:3; SD = 2:7
−40 −35 −30 −25 −20 −15 −10 −5
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
PtS (dBw)
Ec
on
om
ic
 c
os
t a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 R
i (E
uro
s/b
it)
α2 for R2
link cost ΛP0, 
for S → D 
Required source 
power P0, for S → D
α1for R1
α3 for R3
C2 for R2
C1for R1
C3 for R3
Fig. 6. The cost function Ci and the price-power profiles i for the network with i = [1:2; 1:1; 1:3]; SRi =
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